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ABSTRACT 
 
Much debate in the early nineties centered on whether the federal 
entitlement program Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
reduced welfare dependency.  Many contend that AFDC discouraged work, 
increased welfare dependency, and undermined the institution of family.  
Partly in response to these criticisms, welfare was reformed through the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.  
PRWORA modified the primary objectives of welfare by placing more 
emphasis on work experience accumulation and less on human capital 
accumulation.  Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was 
designed to meet this primary objective.  Washington State’s TANF 
program, WorkFirst, utilizes a progressive system of programs 
(components) aimed at reducing welfare dependency through labor force 
participation.   
 
WorkFirst components have a variety of objectives including skills 
training, temporary subsidized employment, and mentoring.  WorkFirst’s 
objective is to accumulate work experience of welfare recipients, thus 
making them more employable.  More work experience should place 
upward pressure on wage rates, which then in turn reduces welfare 
dependency.  We analyze the working decision as it is related to 
Washington State’s program design using a binary choice probit model.  We 
find that welfare recipients who are enrolled in the later stage components 
of WorkFirst are more likely to find work and exit welfare than those that 
have only completed the initial components designed under WorkFirst.  
Cumulatively, WorkFirst seems to be an effective welfare program design.   
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
 
 On July 1, 1997 the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program replaced the federal entitlement program, Aid for Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) in Washington State.  TANF provides 
temporary cash assistance and job training to low-income families with 
dependent children.  Each State is allowed to tailor their welfare program 
design to the specific needs of their clients.  In August 1997, the State of 
Washington created WorkFirst as its welfare program designed under 
TANF.  The WorkFirst design discourages welfare dependency through the 
promotion of labor force participation and sanctions for non-compliance.  
Programs (components) under WorkFirst provide individuals with mentors, 
educational opportunities, and paid work experience.  The underlying 
premise of WorkFirst is that work experience accumulation places upward 
pressure on wage rates.  Components within WorkFirst promote work 
experience and skill building, and through the completion of cumulative 
stages within WorkFirst welfare recipients become less welfare dependent, 
and in many instances self-sufficient. 
 
 Washington State’s WorkFirst program is not an entitlement; it 
provides temporary cash assistance, job training, and work experience to 
welfare recipients.  Recipients are allowed a maximum of 60 months of 
lifetime cash assistance, with at most 24 consecutive months of assistance.  
Recipients must work or search for employment to receive cash assistance.2  
Unsuccessful individuals not finding employment but making an effort 
according to WorkFirst guidelines can qualify for extensions.  Because 
physically or mentally disabled individuals cannot participate in WorkFirst, 
they will continue to receive welfare assistance.3 
 
 WorkFirst is a comprehensive and progressive welfare-to-work 
program that utilizes many components consisting of over 30 different 
employment induced welfare programs.  For the purposes of this paper, we 
will study the effects of only five of these WorkFirst components.  They 
include Job Success Coach Initiative (JSCI), WorkFirst Post-employment 
Labor Exchange (WPLEX), Job Components (JC), Pre-Employment 
 
1 We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and insightful comments with 
regard to this manuscript.  Their comments greatly improved our paper. 
2 All individuals enrolled on TANF must be enrolled in at least one component; most recipients are 
enrolled in more than one. 
3At this point the individual might qualify for SSI (Social Security Insurance) assistance.  Disability 
falls more under SSI.  If chemical dependency or otherwise, individual falls under this type of state 
funding. 
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Training (PET), and Community Jobs (CJ).  We chose these components 
because they are employment training, counseling and guidance programs.  
All five components are different in their nature and each attracts a different 
clientele.  They are also progressive and attract the most political attention.4 
 
Clients with very poor job skills often enter the WorkFirst program 
by enrolling in CJ, PET or JC.  The CJ program is a community-based work 
and skill-building experience for heads of households receiving TANF 
benefits.  The CJ program provides participants with valuable work 
experience and skills training.  CJ benefits both the individual and local 
communities, often leading to a permanent job and job retention while 
meeting WorkFirst participation requirements “to work, look for work or 
prepare for work.”  Recipients that secure jobs under CJ are only 
temporarily employed, most typically for six months.  PET is a program 
designed to assist individuals with additional education.  The majority of 
PET individuals are enrolled in a Microsoft funded community college 
program focused on the acquisition of computer skills.  The JC program is a 
series of classes offered by the state.  These classes teach participants how 
to act professional, look for work, and interview for jobs. 
 
 The JSCI and WPLEX programs tend to attract stronger clients 
whom are typically in the final stages of the WorkFirst program.  The JSCI 
program assigns a job coach to each enrollee.  The job coach guides 
individuals in their job search journey by offering advice and counseling.  
After clients have obtained employment, they receive additional counseling 
from WPLEX call center associates.  After enrollees enter the work force, 
the WPLEX program can assist them in finding better jobs as their job-skills 
improve and work experience increases.   
 
 WorkFirst is a progressive welfare-to-work design because clients 
typically start in JC, CJ or PET.  After completion of any of these 
preliminary components, clients enroll in JSCI or WPLEX.   
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Much experimental design was conducted in the early 1990's as an 
application of welfare reform.  Waiver programs allowed states to 
 
4 A majority of the Washington State sponsored welfare studies focus their attention on the 
performance of JSCI, WPLEX, JC, PET, and CJ components, which determines how TANF funds are 
allocated. 
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experiment with alternatives to the traditional AFDC design.5  Many of 
these waiver programs resemble TANF, focusing on strong work 
requirements through job search, therefore the waiver period can be thought 
of as a foundation for understanding how to model TANF correctly.  The 
waiver period and the research associated with this period directly evaluate 
different program designs, unified by the imposition of strong work 
requirements.  Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) examined an experimental 
welfare model that would eventually mimic TANF by testing whether 
imposing an obligation to work, and the implementation of these policies 
that lead to work, actually increase employment levels which in turn should 
reduce welfare dependency.  The experimental data and design used by 
Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) is known as the Saturation Work Initiative 
Model (SWIM).  From 1985 to 1987 the county of San Diego initiated the 
SWIM welfare design, which took a cohort of people currently enrolled in 
AFDC and placed them in work assignments and other types of 
employment-directed programs.  Results show 75 percent of those who 
participated in SWIM were employed compared to 68 percent for the 
control group, a difference statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) successfully find that the SWIM model 
reduces welfare dependency more than the existing AFDC design.  
However, the authors' do not conclude that the waiver program is a 
successful overall welfare design, it is only marginally better than AFDC. 
 
 Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001), Fein et al. (2001) and O’Neill and 
Hill (2001) all look at the effect that similar waiver programs have had on 
employment, program participation, and wages.  Each of these papers found 
waivers to have positive effects on employment and wages.  In contrast, 
O’Neill and Hill, Bloom and Michalopoulos, and Fein et al. are all similar in 
that they find a negative effect on AFDC participation.  They suggest that 
the effects on wages and employment are due to the enforcement of work 
requirements, not from marginal incentive changes.  Similar results are 
found by Bartik and Eberts (1999); Blank (2000); Figlio and Ziliak (1999); 
Wallace and Blank (1999); and Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, and Connelly (2000).  
Each of these authors' fails to determine whether each program design 
works as it is intended. 
 
 One issue with studying waiver programs is that only short-term 
effects of program reform are considered.  Friedlander, Greenberg, and 
 
5 Waiver programs existed pre-1996.  TANF turned discretion over to each individual state, and the 
waiver period was granted to enable states to test different welfare policies so that when TANF 
eventually took over as the dominant welfare policy, they would be prepared with the type of program 
they wanted to undertake.  Extensive experimental analysis was administered during this period. 
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Robins (1997) evaluate the long-term aspects of government programs for 
the disadvantaged.  Since welfare’s initial inception in 1935, they find no 
support for positive long-term effects on employment, wages, poverty, 
income inequality, and welfare participation.  Although most evaluations of 
the welfare population conclude that there are positive, significant effects of 
training programs in the short run, they find that there is no evidence to 
support this claim over the longer-term.  One explanation is the skills 
learned by participants are not valued by employers over the long-term.  
They should evaluate such a claim given the overall shape of the particular 
labor market for which their sample resides. 
 
 Supply controls typically include recipients’ marital status, age, race, 
education, recent work experience, and welfare history.  Surveys are the 
most common method for collecting labor supply data.  The most 
commonly used surveys include the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID), the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and Longitudinal Database 
of Cases (LDB).6 
 
 Hoynes (2000) incorporated panel data from a subset of the LBD 
survey to estimate the probability of exits, returns and duration with respect 
to labor supply and demand variables using a discrete time hazard model.  
She found that labor market conditions significantly determined exits, 
returns and duration between 1987 and 1992.  That is, welfare recipients are 
more likely to exit welfare and less likely to return when they are earning 
more.  Additionally, she found that the market wage was a strong 
determinate of welfare dependency.  
  
 Harris (1993) uses a panel of data, from the PSID survey, to evaluate 
single mothers enrolled on AFDC from 1984 to 1986.  She finds that the 
guarantee level is insignificant, and that a mother enrolled on AFDC exits 
approximately 67 percent of the time because of an employment 
opportunity.7  Harris (1996) follows up her own work by looking at a longer 
panel from the same survey to estimate the probability of single mothers re-
entering AFDC once they have exited.  Once again, Harris finds the 
 
6 Survey of Income and Program Participation is a sample conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Panel Study on Income Dynamics is a longitudinal survey of US individuals conducted by the 
University of Michigan, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth is conducted by Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the Longitudinal Database of Cases is a 1% sample from the California State Medicaid 
program. 
7 The Guarantee level is the monthly transfer payment awarded to all recipients enrolled in WorkFirst.  
This amount is usually about $550 per month. 
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guarantee to be insignificant and, in general, claims that analyzing welfare 
is not always about the recipient weighing the costs and benefits of exiting 
and then returning.  More important factors are those such as age, number of 
children, education and marriage.  These factors significantly influence 
repeat dependency.  The choice to exit and not return is mostly a function of 
the single mother’s need for dependency and the existing social context she 
lives in.  Women receiving welfare assistance are less likely to exit if they 
are single, have more dependents, older and less educated. 
 
 In a preliminary study using data from the Washington State 
Population Survey, Learch, Mayfield, and Burley (1999) found that 
Washington State females who participated in WorkFirst job search 
programs had 12 to 27 percent higher employment rates, earned 
approximately $213 more per month, and had between 14 and 20 percent 
less welfare enrollment than clients not participating.  They used client 
characteristics as labor supply controls.  Labor demand controls included 
local economic variables and local welfare office administrative practices.  
Their results were admittedly preliminary and required verification.  We 
hope to verify these results using administrative records, and more 
importantly, we intend to analyze the WorkFirst design in the manner for 
which it is designed. 
 
 Supply side factors tend to be significant predictors of welfare 
dependency participation, and so they should be included in any empirical 
specification.  However, generally speaking, demand side factors only 
generate statistically significant coefficients in studies using panels over 
long periods of time.  Because our time horizon is so short, we do not 
include demand side factors in this analysis that are aggregated at the state 
or local level. 
 
 The goals of the above studies are only partially relevant to our work.  
However, our methodology is consistent with past methodologies.  Typical 
methodologies analyze the work-decision with a binary dependent variable 
(probit and logit models).  The use of a dichotomous variable captures 
whether or not recipients are working.  Any model using this feature has the 
ability to predict labor force participation on a vector of independent 
variables.  These types of models are also capable of evaluating welfare 
dependency, indicated by welfare exits and reentry. 
 
 Many current welfare designs have a progressive, cumulative nature 
to them.  By modeling progression one can partially determine how well a 
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program is designed in terms of effectiveness in reducing welfare 
dependency.  To do this, one must be able to collect supply side data 
specific to individuals receiving welfare benefits and their component 
participation choices.  To categorize the sample in this manor, one must 
have access to administrative records.  Individuals entering WorkFirst 
progress through different components of the program until they are ready 
to exit and enter the work force.  Participants that do not complete the series 
of components should be more dependent on welfare and less likely to enter 
the labor force.  The literature has not yet captured this progressive analysis. 
 
III. DATA SET 
 
 Most welfare studies use survey data.  We use Washington State 
Administrative records for our analysis.  We have merged wage data from 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage files with WorkFirst welfare data from 
the JOBS Automation System (JAS) of the Employment Security 
Department (ESD).8  The merged data produces a panel data set, consisting 
of both cross-sectional and time-series elements specific to individuals 
enrolled in WorkFirst.  Furthermore, this panel provides us the ability to 
capture both the working decision and welfare enrollment decision of each 
individual recipient over time.9  We end up with a cross-section of welfare 
recipients between 2000 and 2001.   
 
 The WorkFirst design can only be analyzed by using administrative 
records.  Surveys offer information about the aggregate welfare population 
and are often inaccurate due to survey approaches.  By using individual 
welfare and wage data we can track individual decision making over time.  
Specifically, we can track which WorkFirst components individuals have 
enrolled in, which component they started in, when they finished each 
component, and how they are doing in the labor force after exiting each 
component.  The merged data we have been able to collect allows us to 
evaluate what no other study has been able to, namely, measure the 
effectiveness of the WorkFirst design. 
 
 
8 Each employer in the state of Washington reports earnings for each of their employees on a quarterly 
basis to the Washington State Employment Security Department.  All data are provided for by Labor 
Market and Economic Activity (LMEA).  LMEA is a subsidiary of the Employment Security 
Department in Washington State (ESD).  In Washington State the ESD has multiple objectives, some 
of which include the evaluation of Unemployment Insurance (UI) and WorkFirst in Washington State.    
9 All data are used confidentially herein.  Granted Access implies that confidentiality will be 
maintained. 
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 Table 1 provides various descriptive statistics of explanatory factors 
for the entire sample.  Of the five WorkFirst components, WPLEX 
generated the highest median earnings and employment rates while having 
the lowest percentage of reentry into WorkFirst; $2,742 per quarter, 92.1 
percent, and 12.9 percent respectively.  JSCI has the highest exit percentage 
at 23 percent.  JC, PET, and CJ appear to be the least successful of the 
WorkFirst components.  For example, after completing CJ only 45.3 percent 
were employed, only 12 percent exited, and median earnings were a meager 
$1,624 per quarter.  Demographically, the components appear very similar; 
marriage percentages, education levels, mean age of youngest child, and 
number of children residing in the welfare recipient’s household are similar 
across components.  However, work experience is very different across 
components.  Individuals enrolled in WPLEX and JSCI have more work 
experience than those in JC, PET, and CJ.  Even though the performance of 
these later programs appears to be disappointing, they are not.  Through 
self-selection, participants that enter JSCI and WPLEX are more prepared 
for work.  Individuals that are less prepared for the work force are 
encouraged to first enter JC, PET, and CJ.   
 
 We speculate that upon completion of these initial components, 
individuals are more likely to succeed in WorkFirst’s terminal components, 
WPLEX and JSCI.  It is evident from Table 1 that enrollees who 
successfully progress through WorkFirst components are better suited for 
the work force.  That is, the likelihood an enrollee finds a job and exits 
welfare is higher than that of an individual who bypasses one or more of the 
initial components of WorkFirst.  Those enrolled in the later stage 
components seem to be descriptively more successful than those enrolled in 
the initial stages of the WorkFirst design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 5, 2004 
27 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Component JSCI WPLEX JC PET CJ 
N 691 1122 8637 1588 1838 
N with UI-reported 
wages 571 1033 4635 739 832 
% employed in the 
CY2001, Q1 83.00% 92.10% 53.70% 46.50% 45.30% 
Median quarterly 
earnings in CY2001, 
Q1 
$1,657  $2,724  $1,496  $1,954  $1,624  
% who exit TANF in 
January 2001 23.00% 17.90% 18.00% 14.70% 12.00% 
% returning in Feb., 
March, or April 2001 15.10% 12.90% 17.10% 19.30% 18.20% 
Mean age of client 31* 33 33 32* 33* 
Mean age of youngest 
child 6* 7* 8* 7* 8* 
Mean number of 
children 2 2 2 2 2 
% that never made it 
through eighth grade 10.48% 11.42% 12.34% 10.45% 12.01% 
% with some high 
school 41.22% 24.28% 29.98% 34.54% 35.20% 
% with high school 
diploma/GED 42.16% 49.31% 45.68% 44.37% 43.23% 
% with some college 5.50% 13.17% 10.36% 9.64% 8.70% 
% with at least a 
BS/BA 0.62% 1.81% 1.64% 0.99% 0.85% 
Percent married 23% 32%* 28%* 24%* 22%* 
% of past 24 quarters 
employed 43.79% 44.13% 34.90% 33.05% 35.83% 
% of past 4 quarters 
employed 57.58% 62.10% 43.02% 37.48% 30.16% 
Median earnings over 
past 4 quarters 1,018 1,680 878 895 681 
Percent with zero 
earnings in 6 years 2.28% 4.18% 12.79% 11.83% 10.64% 
Data Source: JAS, UI wage file, monthly JSCI report, an * says that the 
cell in question is significantly different than the caseload.   
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IV. METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
 To model the Washington State welfare recipient welfare-to-work 
choice we utilize a discrete dependent variable similar to that of Nakosteen 
and Zimmer (1980).  We will let  represent welfare recipient ’s utility 
of remaining on welfare while  will denote ’s utility of exiting welfare 
given they are employed.  If  is a set of individual characteristics unique 
to recipient , then the corresponding linear random utility model has the 
form 
 
     and      (1) 
 
Utility for each choice is unobservable.  However, the choice made by 
recipient  reveals which choice provides greater utility.  If we define  to 
be the observable choice that  makes, then we can let  equal one when 
 exceeds ; otherwise,  will be assigned the value zero.  If we let F 
represent the cumulative normal distribution function, , and  
, then the probability that  equals one is10 
 
 
 
provided that the disturbances of system (1) are normally distributed.  
    
 The probit model will allow us to determine how effective WPLEX, 
JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC are at assisting WorkFirst participants in exiting 
welfare given the employment choice, as measured by our dependent 
variable which represents an individual who has exited welfare and is 
employed, W = 1.  To do this, we compare an unrestricted model with six 
restricted models.  Each regression model will include the following set of 
 
10 The probability of W = 1 is  
 
where F is denotes the cumulative normal distribution function, , and . 
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individual characteristics: work experience (past 6 years), work experience 
(past year), education level, number of children, age of client, age of 
youngest child, and wages. 
  
 We use component identifiers to flag those enrolled in each of the 
included components: WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC.  If a client is 
enrolled in the th component, then the corresponding component 
identifier, , will be assigned a one, zero otherwise.  The unrestricted 
model’s independent variables will include the entire set of WorkFirst 
participation identifiers,  
 
. 
 
For testing the direct effect of each component, we specify five restricted 
models that remove a corresponding component identifier.  For instance, 
when measuring CJ's effect on being employed and exiting welfare the 
component identifier matrix becomes  
 
. 
 
The sixth restricted model includes no component identifiers.  The empirical 
model specification is 
 
 , (2) 
 
where the subscript m on D identifies the specification of the model as 
either the unrestricted (U) or one of the restricted models: WPLEX, JSCI, 
PET, CJ, or JC. 
 
 A likelihood ratio test (LR) will be used to compare the unrestricted 
model with the six restricted models.11  The likelihood ratio test determines 
whether each  coefficient corresponding to each component identifier is 
 
11 The likelihood ratio statistic is , where  and  are the log-likelihood 
functions evaluated at the restricted and unrestricted estimates, respectively (Greene, 2000 pp. 826).  
For the unrestricted model, SAS reported  = 7668.53.  The unrestricted model included all of 
the explanatory and indicator variables.  The values of  for the restricted models ranged from 
7668.54 to 7729.59.  Table 3 summarizes the values of these statistics and their respective Log-
Likelihood ratios. 
 
j
jD
[ ], , , ,U WPLEX JSCI PET CJ JCD D D D D=D
[ ], , ,CJ WPLEX JSCI PET JCD D D D=D
( ); ,mW f t dt
e
µ s
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-¥
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significantly different from the unrestricted model.  A significant chi-square 
value implies that the component in question is a significant predictor of 
employment and welfare exits, relative to all other components.  If the 
restricted model that excludes all dummy variables is significant, the five 
components are more likely to create employment and reduce welfare 
dependency than all other WorkFirst components not included in our study.  
This test will determine the total effect of WorkFirst on employment and 
welfare exits.  The results of the other five restricted models determine if an 
individual WorkFirst component is a significant predictor by itself, a direct 
test of the individual effect of each WorkFirst component. 
 
 We would also like to predict how welfare recipient quarterly 
earnings, Y, are impacted by their participation in WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, 
and JC.  To do this, we will estimate the parameters of  
 
  (3) 
 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Equation (3) will determine which 
predictors have a significant relationship with earnings, and whether or not 
the relationship is positive or negative.  Each component identifier will 
determine how expected earnings are affected by the participation in each of 
the five WorkFirst components.  The intercept coefficient includes all other 
individuals in the caseload but not enrolled in one of the five components.  
We simultaneously control for demographics and prior work experience 
with the inclusion of . 
 
V. RESULTS 
 
 The results of the nonlinear estimation of equation (2) are reported in 
Table 2 below.  Odds ratios and their corresponding standard errors for each 
of the predictors in the unrestricted binary choice probit model are included 
in this table.  Results show that coefficients for identifiers corresponding to 
WPLEX, JSCI, and JC have the highest odds ratios (each is greater than 
zero).  The WPLEX odds ratio is 1.364 suggesting individuals enrolled in 
WPLEX are 1.364 times more likely to be employed and have exited 
welfare than those recipients not enrolled in WPLEX.  The JSCI odds ratio 
is even greater at 2.355.  Those who have successfully exited JSCI are 2.355 
times more likely to be employed and off of welfare than those not 
completing JSCI during the same period.  The JC component also has 
significant positive effects on employment and welfare exits. 
 
i i i iY g x= + + +θX φD
iX
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Table 2 Odds Ratios of the Unrestricted Probit Model 
Odds Ratio Estimates Effects Point Estimate 
Standard 
Errors 
Education 1.000 0.000087 
Age Client 0.989 0.00265 
Age of Youngest Child 0.992 0.00355 
Work Experience (last 6 years) 1.025 0.00437 
Work Experience (previous 
year) 1.035 0.0183 
Number Children 0.966 0.0196 
Community Jobs (CJ) 0.974 0.0824 
JSCI 2.355 0.0818 
Pre-Employment Training 
(PET) 0.988 0.0814 
WPLEX 1.364 0.0774 
J-Components (JC) 1.431 0.0788 
 
 Pre-employment training and community jobs enrollment and 
completion is actually less likely to yield employment and a welfare exit 
(0.988 and 0.974).  Education and work experience enhance the enrollee’s 
likelihood of finding work and exiting welfare; while the number of 
children, age of youngest child, and age of client appear to have very little 
effect.  The older the client or the more children the client has, decrease the 
chances of employment and exiting welfare.  Clients that have younger 
children are less likely to be employed and more likely to exit welfare.  This 
is a general conclusion not necessarily related to a particular component. 
 
 The likelihood ratio test statistics comparing the unrestricted probit 
model with our six restricted models are reported in Table 3 below.  The 
first row of Table 3 corresponds to the restricted regression that excludes all 
component identifiers, while the other five rows correspond to the 
remaining five restricted regressions.  Notice that the test statistic associated 
with row 1 is 122.18.  This implies that the programs we chose to include in 
this study (WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, and JC) significantly improve a 
WorkFirst client’s likelihood of being employed and exiting welfare.  Each 
restricted model tests whether or not any of the individual programs have 
significant effects on employment and welfare exits relative to competing 
programs.  Our results suggest JSCI, WPLEX, and JC all significantly 
increase the likelihood of finding work and exiting welfare, while pre-
employment training and community jobs do not.  Thus, individuals 
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enrolled in WorkFirst’s initial components are not as prepared to exit 
welfare as their counterparts in the terminal components, and so should 
remain in the program until the terminal components are completed. 
 
Table 3 Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics 
(Unrestricted  = 7668.53) 
Restricted Model  Likelihood Ratio* 
No Identifiers 7729.59 122.118 
JSCI 7717.41 97.75 
J-Components 7678.24 19.42 
WPLEX 7676.23 15.402 
Community Jobs 7668.58 0.099 
Pre-Employment Training 7668.54 0.022 
* The chi-square statistic is calculated by subtracting the 
unrestricted  from that of the restricted (Greene 
2000, pp. 826).  
 
 The results of the empirical estimation of equation (3) are reported in 
Table 4 below.  Equation (3) predicts a welfare recipient’s expected 
quarterly earnings, Y, given the individual’s characteristics and participation 
in WPLEX, JSCI, PET, CJ, or JC.  Work experience, JSCI, and WPLEX 
significantly increase earnings, on average.  For instance, if a participant in 
WorkFirst is enrolled in WPLEX, her earnings will increase, on average, by 
$1,018.18 per quarter after completion.  Likewise, if an individual is 
enrolled in JSCI, her earnings will increase by an average of $491.69 per 
quarter.  The Community Jobs, Pre-Employment Training, and J-
Components programs appear to have negative effects on quarterly 
earnings; these programs reduce earnings by $92.82, $105.14, and $48.97 
respectively.  The intercept term represents all other programs in the 
WorkFirst caseload.  Therefore, all other components within the WorkFirst 
program increase earnings, on average, by $114.62.  Age, work experience, 
and number of children are positively correlated with earnings, each is 
significant.  Age of youngest child has a negative correlation with earnings.  
Education is not a significant predictor of earnings, and therefore has no 
relationship with earnings.  The welfare population as a whole is 
uneducated; most do not have college degrees, and a college degree is the 
only degree that could really differentiate earnings between these 
individuals. 
 
 
2 log-likelihood- ´
2 log-likelihood- ´
2 log-likelihood- ´
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Table 4 OLS Estimates of Equation 2 
Effect Estimated Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
Intercept 114.62 47.32 
Education -0.206 0.369 
Age of Client 7.588 1.467 
Age of Youngest Child -5.93 1.553 
Work Experience (last 6 years) 57.14 2.230 
Work Experience (previous year) 36.71 9.248 
Number of Children 63.09 9.124 
Community Jobs (CJ) -92.82 36.68 
JSCI 491.69 54.13 
Pre-Employment Training (PET) -105.14 37.54 
WPLEX 1018.18 45.46 
J-Components (JC) -48.97 38.82 
 
 Those who have completed later stage components have a higher 
probability of working and exiting welfare at higher wages (JSCI and 
WPLEX).  Those who complete initial stage components are less likely to 
find work, exit welfare, and earn lower wages than those completing later 
stage components (CJ, PET, and JC).  WorkFirst, by design, encourages 
individuals to initially enroll in initial stage components such as CJ, PET, or 
JC.   After completing these initial components, the welfare recipient is then 
ready to look for work and enrolls in JSCI or WPLEX.  Those welfare 
recipients who progress through the WorkFirst design face better odds of 
exiting the welfare rolls through employment and earn higher wages than 
those who do not.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Our results show that WPLEX and JSCI are stronger predictors of 
employment, while completion reduces welfare dependency; both programs 
increase wages significantly.  On the other hand, the pre-employment 
training and community jobs components are not strong predictors of 
employment and do not significantly reduce welfare dependency.  CJ and 
PET actually decrease earnings on average.  This can be explained in 
several ways.  First, people that are enrolled in WPLEX and JSCI tend to 
have more work experience, are younger, and have fewer children on 
average; demographics of this group are more favorable.  Secondly, these 
enrollees may have already been through at least one of the other WorkFirst 
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programs, for instance, pre-employment training or community jobs.  That 
is, individuals often learn job skills and job training before being enrolled in 
WPLEX or JSCI.  The WorkFirst design is intended to build work 
experience and skills through completion of several components, or stages.   
 
 This analysis has showed several things and has also left several 
questions unanswered.  WPLEX and JSCI are more effective, on average, 
than all other WorkFirst programs at increasing the likelihood of 
employment and exiting welfare.  However, those enrolled in WPLEX or 
JSCI could be better prepared for the job market than those enrolled in CJ, 
PET, and JC.  Whether this is due to the design of WorkFirst or attributed to 
the demographics and personal characteristics of each individual is 
ambiguous.  However, overall, if the welfare recipient does progress 
through the various stages, components, they are more likely to be 
employed and exit welfare.  
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